In this paper, we propose a novel robust visual classification framework that uses double quantization (dquant) to defend against adversarial examples in a specific attack scenario called ''subsequent adversarial examples'' where test images are injected with adversarial noise. The proposed system can remove the adversarial noise completely on this particular attack scenario. First, we analyze the potential sources of adversarial noise and classify adversarial examples into three classes. We then propose a novel effective solution, dquant, to target a specific class of adversarial examples. The first quantization is 1-bit dithering applied to both training and test images. The second one is linear quantization, which is applied to test images just before being inputted to a model to remove any adversarial noise. The linear quantizer guarantees that original 1-bit test images will be restored regardless of adversarial noise distance, and, therefore, dquant maintains identical accuracy whether or not the model is under attack. The results show that dquant achieves comparable accuracy, 85.28 % on the CIFAR-10 and 94.99 % on the Oxford-IIIT Pet datasets against three state-of-the-art adversaries with even a previously untested maximum adversarial distance of 64.
I. INTRODUCTION
Visual classification systems are primarily powered by convolutional neural networks. A convolutional neural network (CNN) is a type of deep neural network inspired by the human visual system. Recent advances in deep learning show that CNNs have brought major breakthroughs in computer vision [1] . Impressively, the last ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) 2017 proved that the image classification accuracy has surpassed the level of human performance (i.e., error rate of 2.25 %). There is no doubt that CNNs have dominated visual recognition systems in many different applications. Due to their remarkable performance, CNNs have been deployed in securitycritical applications, such as face recognition, biometric authentication, medical image analysis, and self-driving cars.
Nevertheless, machine learning in general suffers from attacks such as model inversion attacks [2] , membership inference attacks [3] and adversarial attacks [4] - [6] . In this work, we focus on adversarial attacks. Researchers have The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jenny Mahoney. already discovered that neural networks are vulnerable to certain imperceptible perturbations [7] - [9] . CNNs are no exceptions to such vulnerabilities. These particular perturbations added to input images are known as adversarial examples. Basically, adversarial examples can cause neural networks to misclassify with high confidence or force them to classify a targeted class. As an example, in Fig. 1 , the network classifies the clean image correctly as tabby with a 47.96 % probability. After adding a small fraction of noise, the network misclassifies the tabby cat as mosquito net with 99.99 % confidence.
Adversarial noise can also be image-agnostic as proposed in [10] . Recent adversarial attacks are even more intriguing with better control, such as the multi-targeted adversarial example [11] and exclusive targeted adversarial example [12] . Moreover, one work shows that an adversarial example can be photographed with a smartphone, and the taken picture can still fool a neural network [13] . Another work [14] demonstrated that it is possible to construct 3-D adversarial objects. This is probably dangerous, especially for autonomous cars. An attacker can potentially paint or use stickers to cause accidents [15] , [16] . Furthermore, one recent work specifically targets detection systems, such as Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) devices [17] . Therefore, neural networks including CNNs have received a significant amount of attention, and a lot of effort has been put towards adversarial robustness. Nevertheless, most conventional defenses drop in accuracy significantly, such as adversarial training. Maintaining accuracy and getting adversarial robustness is a growing concern and an on-going area of research with a high demand for computer vision because of the wide area of applications.
Therefore, in this work, we propose a mechanism for defending against adversarial attacks given a test image that is in 1-bit. The proposed system enforces the use of 1-bit dithered images in training and testing. During testing, it quantizes a test image linearly to remove adversarial noise completely. Due to the fact that the test images are in 1-bit, the proposed system achieves comparable accuracy whether or not the model is under attack. We make the following contributions in this paper.
• We analyze the potential attack zones for adversarial examples and classify the examples in three classes for the first time.
• We are the first to target a specific attack scenario and propose an effective solution that trains networks with 1-bit dithered images and uses linear quantization as an adversarial filter during testing.
• We present the results of the proposed method with different datasets and adversarial noise distances (up to a previously untested noise distance) with three wellknown adversaries to confirm the effectiveness. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents background information and related work on adversarial attacks and defenses. The proposed framework with adversarial robustness (Section III) includes the problem definition, notation, the proposed procedure, and justification of how and why the proposed method works. Experiments and discussion are presented in Section IV, and Section V concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK A. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
The goals of adversarial attacks on neural networks are confidence reduction, misclassification, and targeted misclassification. The attacks can be divided into two categories: poisoning/causative attacks (i.e., training time attacks) and evasion/exploratory attacks (i.e., test time attacks) [18] . Poisoning attacks happen during training time, where an adversary introduces crafted malicious examples into the training data to manipulate the behavior of models. Even one single poisonous image can compromise a model when transfer learning is used [19] . Evasion attacks are also called ''adversarial examples,'' in which crafted imperceptible perturbations are added. In this work, we focus on defending against evasion attacks. Evasion attacks can be further classified into two groups, white-box and black-box, on the basis of the knowledge available to an attacker. White-box attacks have direct access to a model, and black-box ones do not.
There are many kinds of white-box attacks. In a typical white-box attack scenario, an attacker A generates an adversarial exampleX given an input X and a model h θ (.) such that h θ (X ) = h θ (X ) or h θ (X ) = k, where k is a targeted class. Normally, a classifier optimizes the parameter θ to minimize the average loss given m pairs of example X and label y. The optimization problem can be described as
An adversarial example is computed by maximizing the loss with respect to the input X with some noise . The underlying idea is to make small changes to X to maximize the loss. It can be written as
where P is a perturbation set. In practice, a full allowable perturbation set P is difficult to compute in one way since there are many different transformations, such as adding noise, translating, rotating, and quantizing. Therefore, attackers consider a subset of an allowable perturbation set P, which does not affect any visual information. A common way to define the perturbation size is to constrain the perturbation by norm-balls (e.g., 1 , 2 , ∞ ). For ∞ bounded attacks, the allowable perturbation set P is
where is the magnitude of the perturbation. In other words, the magnitude of the perturbation is in the range of [− , ]. We highlight three well-known white-box test time attacks as they are deployed to evaluate the proposed method. They are the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [4] , Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [5] , [20] and Carlini and Wagner 2 attack (CW) [6] . The first two methods are ∞ bounded and CW is 2 bounded attack. The goal of FGSM is misclassification, and it is computationally efficient. An adversarial exampleX of FGSM [4] can be generated bŷ
where ∇ X (h θ (X ), y) is the gradient of the loss function with respect to an input image X . FGSM is a single step approach, and a more powerful version of FGSM is PGD [5] , [20] .
It is a straightforward way of applying FGSM multiple times iteratively. The adversarial example at the (t + 1) th iteration with PGD [20] iŝ
where α is the step size, and the result is projected back to the ∞ -norm ball at each iteration (i.e., X + ). Carlini and Wagner refined box-constrained L-BFGS [7] attack. They compute an adversarial example by solving the following minimization problem in tanh space with a new loss function [6] . It can be written as
There are also black-box attacks where an attacker knows only the inputs and outputs of a model. The adversarial examples are built by using a surrogate model instead of a real one. Such black-box attacks were proposed in [15] , [21] .
As machine learning has become a general tool for solving many problems, it is quintessential to test machine learning models in adversarial settings.
B. ADVERSARIAL DEFENSES
An intuitive way of defending against adversarial examples is including adversarial examples in the training process. This is known as adversarial training and is a training time defense method. Early work [4] suggested using an adversarial objective function during training that works as an effective regularizer. A recent work quantizes training images by finding a bit depth that maximizes the loss during backpropagation [22] . Although their method is resilient to FGSM, it is not robust against a stronger adversary such as PGD. One of the other state-of-the-art methods is PGD training [20] . It was done on the CIFAR-10 dataset and had empirically strong robustness against strong adversaries. The basic idea is to train a network with input images perturbed by PGD. Nevertheless, PGD training is computationally expensive and drops the accuracy significantly. From the MIT MadryLab CIFAR10 Challenge leaderboard, the accuracy of an adversarially trained model against 20-step PGD was 47.04 % [23] .
To improve adversarial robustness while maintaining accuracy, many works have attempted to find a defensive transformation t(.). Previous works on image processing-based defense include applying an average filter [24] , having several image transformations (bit depth reduction, JPEG compression, total variance minimization) [25] , and finding a clean input by using a generative adversarial network (GAN) [26] . However, they all have failed in white-box settings in [27] or [28] . To reinforce these weak defense methods, Raff et al. [29] proposed a stronger defense by combining a large number of transforms stochastically. This defense is called ''Barrage of Random Transforms'' (BaRT) [29] . BaRT is applied in both training and testing phases. However, BaRT is computationally expensive.
There are other defense mechanisms such as defensive distillation where two models are used to train a network [30] .
The first model is trained by using hard labels, and the second one is trained to predict the probabilities of the first model. Nonetheless, it was reported that defensive distillation is not robust against adversarial examples [6] .
Another historical problem with conventional adversarial defense methods is scalability. Inspiring works such as [31] - [34] proposed provable secure training. Although provable methods are attractive and desirable, they are not available for large datasets. Furthermore, there are a few existing methods such as those using wavelet-based denoising [35] and high-level representation guided denoising (HGD) [36] that have reached the scale of ImageNet [37] . However, these two examples have been defeated (i.e., it was reported that the accuracy was reduced to 0 %) [38] . Moreover, Xie, Zhang, Yuille, et al. utilize random resizing and random padding as a defense [39] . Although their work was ranked second in the NIPS 2017 adversarial defense challenge, the accuracy was later reduced to 0 %. In addition, one work based on image processing [25] also reached the level of ImageNet, but the accuracy also dropped. Adversarial training (i.e., one of the state-of-the-art adversarial defenses) was also done on ImageNet [5] . However, it was reported that the accuracy was very low at 1.5 % when the perturbation = 16 in [29] .
All in all, although adversarial training with PGD provides a provable robust model, the accuracy will drop significantly. Among the transformation-based defenses, the best model by BaRT provides 65 % and 36 % accuracy when under attack on ImageNet. In spite of the significant improvement with BaRT, applying many transforms on each image is computationally expensive.
In our work, we approach adversarial defense in a different way. We explore application areas specifically so that we can tackle adversarial attacks effectively. Deep learning requires a large amount of data and computational resources. Therefore, it is quite often carried out in the cloud. The user generates datasets, and training and testing are done in the cloud environment. In this scenario, the test images may be intercepted by adversarial noise. The proposed mechanism can remove this kind of adversarial noise effectively and maintain the same accuracy whether or not the model is under attack.
C. QUANTIZATION
In this work, we use linear quantization and dithering for training and test images.
Quantization is a mapping from a large set of input values to a smaller set of output values. For linear quantization in images, the pixel values are linearly scaled down in accordance with the bit depth. In this work, a 1-bit quantizer is utilized and defined as:
The pixel values in {0, 1, . . . , 254, 255} are mapped to either 0 or 255 in accordance with the closest palette color. Technically, this is a thresholding operation (i.e., values less than 128 are mapped to 0 and those greater than or equal to 128 are to 255). Class C is Subsequent Adversarial Example (SAE). Adversarial noise is added in class A and B before test image is built. After test image has been prepared, adversarial noise is injected (referred to class C adversarial example).
To randomize quantization errors, dithering is usually applied in the quantization. We use the 1-bit Floyd-Steinberg dithering algorithm [40] in this work. Hereinafter, we refer to Floyd-Steinberg dithering as FSD. The following error diffusion filter is applied to distribute the residual quantization error in FSD.
The pixel indicated as p in the above filter is the current pixel being scanned, and the pixels indicated as s are already being scanned.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK WITH ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
We analyze the possible attack zones where adversarial examples can appear. The attackers can add adversarial noise before or after a test image is prepared. We classify adversarial examples into three classes on the basis of the origin of the adversarial noise (see Fig. 2 [4] , [6] , [20] before reaching the model. Class B and class C adversarial examples are similar. The only difference is that the generated noise is added before or after a test image is prepared. As shown in Fig. 2 , the adversarial examples from class A and B are infected before the test images are prepared. The test image is injected with adversarial noise on the way to the server after the test image has been generated (i.e., class C). In this work, we focus on adversarial examples defined by class C for the first time. The proposed system will be demonstrated to be able to remove adversarial noise completely on class C adversarial examples.
B. NOTATION
The following notations are utilized throughout this paper.
• The index pair (i, j) denotes pixel location.
• A tensor X 8−bit denotes an 8-bit image, and its element is written as X 8−bit (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 254, 255}.
• A tensor X 1−bit denotes a 1-bit image, and its element is written as X 1−bit (i, j) ∈ {0, 255}.
• A tensorX denotes an adversarial example and its corresponding plain image is X .
• A tensor X denotes a sanitized image (X is filtered by linear quantization).
• FSD(.) denotes a function that carries out Floyd-Steinberg dithering (FSD) (see also algorithm 1).
• A(.) denotes a function that deploys an attack algorithm and generates an adversarial example.
• A tensor denotes an adversarial noise that is added to the clean image X by A(.).
• n denotes the largest integer smaller than n.
C. PROPOSED PROCEDURE
The framework of the proposed system is depicted in Fig. 3 .
The proposed system enforces the use of 1-bit dithered images for training and testing. Both training and testing images are quantized with dithering by the FSD algorithm. Specifically, the FSD algorithm is described in algorithm 1.
The FSD first finds the nearest color (whether 0 or 255) and calculates the residual error. The error is distributed to the neighbouring pixels by a diffusion filter (see Section II-C).
The proposed procedure is detailed as follows. 1) Both training and testing images are first quantized to one bit with dithering by FSD (algorithm 1). This process can be described as
The resulting dithered images are used to train a model. 2) For testing, a testing dithered image from step (1) may be attacked by FGSM [4] , PGD [20] , or CW [6] . The attacking process is defined aŝ
3) Linear quantization is applied to the attacked image (adversarial examples) from step (2) . The sanitized image is described as
The resulting sanitized image is sent to the model for inference. 
D. JUSTIFICATION
Let beX 1−bit − X 1−bit . SubstitutingX 1−bit = X 1−bit + to (9), we obtain
Since X 1−bit (i, j) ∈ {0, 255}, the following equation holds
under a condition that | (i, j)| < 128. This condition is generally satisfied because adversarial noise is usually imperceptible to keep low distortion and the previously known tested noise distance is 32. Especially, the attacks FGSM [4] , PGD [20] , or CW [6] can be written as
where ∞ < . Therefore, X 1−bit becomes exactly the same as X 1−bit after applying linear quantization for < 128.
For ease of understanding, we extracted 50 pixels from one test image and visualized the change in pixel values in dquant in Fig. 4 . In the figure, an 8-bit image X 8−bit in (a) was dithered to generate a 1-bit X 1−bit in (b). Next, to form the test imageX 1−bit , an adversarial noise with the distance = 16 was added as shown in (c). The noise was completely removed by linear quantization as shown in (d) (i.e., the original 1-bit image was reconstructed from the noisy one).
In this work, we focus on class C adversarial examples where test images are 1-bit ones. In the case of class A and B adversarial examples, test images are generally 8-bit ones. The proposed method works well under three conditions: (a) Adversarial noise is additive as in (12) . examples do not satisfy the above requirements, linear quantization cannot remove the adversarial noise completely.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION

A. DATASETS
We utilized two datasets, CIFAR-10 [42] and Oxford-IIIT Pet [43] , to carry out the experiment. CIFAR-10 consists of 60,000 color images (dimension of 32 × 32 × 3) with 10 classes (6000 images for each class) where 50,000 images are for training and 10,000 for testing. The Oxford-IIIT Pet dataset comprises 37 classes of cat and dog breeds with approximately 200 images for each class. There are a total of 7390 high-resolution color images. We resized them to (224 × 224 × 3) during the experiments. We split the dataset into 5912 training images and 1478 test images.
B. METHODOLOGY
Regarding the framework of the proposed system given in Fig. 3 , we first quantized the training images with dithering. The dithered images were used to train a deep residual network [44] , specifically, ResNet20, for the CIFAR-10 dataset and ResNet34 for the Oxford-IIIT Pet dataset.
After the training was done, we also dithered the test images and deployed three white-box adversaries, namely, FGSM [4] , PGD [5] , and CW [6] . Given the test datasets, the goal of the adversaries was to misclassify the images (i.e., to reduce the accuracy). Both of the attacks were performed on the test images of the datasets. The ∞ norm perturbation distance for the adversaries was in the range of [2, 64] (i.e., = [2, 4, 8, 16, 22, 32, 64] ). An example of 8-bit and 1-bit test images with different adversarial noise for CIFAR-10 is shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . Moreover, a sample image (both 8-bit and 1-bit) with varying adversarial noise distances for the Oxford-IIIT Pet dataset is illustrated in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 . For CW attack, we used a confidence parameter value of κ = 20. The test images were linearly quantized with the 1-bit quantizer and proceeded to get inferred by the proposed trained model.
To confirm the effectiveness of the proposed system, we also implemented state-of-the-art adversarial defense methods, that is, PGD adversarial training [20] and BaRT [29] , to compare the results.
We used PyTorch [45] (version 1.1.0) and fastai [46] (version 1.0.54) to carry out the experiments.
C. EXPERIMENTS WITH CIFAR-10 1) TRAINING CONDITIONS
We used ResNet20 without pre-trained weights for the CIFAR-10 dataset with a batch size of 128 and live augmentation (random cropping with padding = 4 and random VOLUME 7, 2019 TABLE 1. Results of FGSM and PGD attacks. Accuracy (%) of ResNet20, proposed model (ResNet20-dquant), and state-of-the-art models, (ResNet20 w/Adv.Train) and ResNet20-BaRT, under various on CIFAR-10 dataset. ''Normal'' is result of classifying clean images, and ''Attacked'' shows results of adversarial examples using FGSM and PGD attacks. Asterisk ( * ) refers to testing ResNet20-BaRT model with attacked images, where adversarial noise was generated after applying BaRT.
horizontal flip). The network was trained for 160 epochs with stochastic gradient descent optimization with an initial learning rate of 0.1. A step learning rate scheduler was used with the parameters (lr_steps = 40, gamma = 0.1). The weight_decay and momentum were configured with 0.0001 and 0.9, respectively.
2) EXPERIMENTS
We trained the following four models.
• ResNet20: This is the baseline model trained with clean images.
• ResNet20 w/Adv.Train: This model is adversarially trained by PGD training [20] , where = 16/255.
• ResNet20-BaRT: We trained this model with BaRT [29] , where the number of transforms k = 5. There are ten transform groups in BaRT. In our experiment, we used only seven of them, excluding the zoom group, contrast group, and denoising group. The excluded transform groups cause the loss not a number (NaN) in our experiment. Therefore, we did not include these transforms in this experiment for the CIFAR-10 dataset.
• ResNet20-dquant (proposed): This model is trained with 1-bit dithered images by the proposed framework. One-bit dithering is enforced by the proposed framework because dithering helps improve accuracy and adversarial noise on 1-bit images can be completely removed. For testing the models, clean images and adversarial examples with FGSM, PGD with varying adversarial noise distances and CW were used. Particularly, in testing ResNet20-BaRT, we considered two scenarios: adversarial noise being added before applying BaRT and after applying random BaRT to test images. To differentiate the two scenarios, we mark the latter case with an asterisk (*ResNet20-BaRT) in Table 1 . One-bit dithered images were used to test the ResNet20-dquant (proposed) model. Table 1 and 2 summarize the results obtained from the experiments for the CIFAR-10 dataset, and Fig. 9 plots the accuracy against varying adversarial noise distances for both (a) FGSM and (b) PGD attacks. As shown in Table 1 , the results suggest that the proposed system is effective at defending against adversarial examples with comparable accuracy given that the test-dataset contained 1-bit dithered images. ResNet20-dquant achieved identical accuracy (i.e., 85.28 %) whether or not the model was under attack. In addition, the proposed system was resilient to any noise distance ≤ 127. In Fig. 9 , ResNet-dquant is displayed as a straight violet line at the top of the graph, and it maintained the highest accuracy for both FGSM and PGD adversaries under attacks. It is noteworthy that dithering improved the accuracy; the model trained with 1-bit quantized images without dithering dropped in accuracy by 10.00 %. We also experimented with 2-bit dithered images. The accuracy was improved by 2.00 % when the noise distance was less than 16. However, the noise distance from an attacker is not predictable. Therefore, the proposed framework enforces the use of 1-bit dithered images. Moreover, ResNet20-dquant is also able to defend the attack with 2 metric (CW) as shown in Table 2 .
3) RESULTS
When not under attack, ResNet20 trained with plain images had the highest accuracy (i.e., 90.71 %). However, the accuracy was reduced to 0 % when a PGD attack with = 8 was applied and to 0.21 % on CW attack. The blue curve in Fig. 9 shows the accuracy drop with respect to for both FGSM and PGD attacks.
Although the adversarially trained model, ResNet20 w/ Adv.Train, was resistant to adversarial examples up to a certain degree, the accuracy dropped significantly as increased. Moreover, ResNet20 w/Adv.Train had low accuracy (i.e., 52.76 %) under normal conditions (not under attack). The accuracy under attack with different is plotted in Fig. 9 (orange curve).
In comparison, ResNet20-BaRT model maintained an accuracy of 80 % approximately with all values under the condition that the attacker adds noise to plain images. However, given the test dataset, it is possible that an attacker can do anything as long as the visual information is maintained. We assume that an attacker may apply a random BaRTlike transform and generate adversarial examples. The results suggest that such an attack is effective. This can reduce the accuracy up to 0.54 % when using = 64. In Fig. 9 , the curves (green and red) represents the ResNet20-BaRT performance over FGSM and PGD.
In all three attacks, ResNet20-dquant maintains the same accuracy (85.28 %) whether or not the model is under attack.
D. EXPERIMENTS WITH OXFORD-IIIT PET 1) TRAINING CONDITIONS
We also evaluated the proposed framework on the Oxford-IIIT Pet dataset with transfer learning. Transfer learning has been proved to be effective in various visual recognition tasks [47] . Therefore, in this work, we employed ResNet34 with ImageNet pre-trained weights. The optimizer was AdamW [48] , and the parameters were a batch size of 64 and a learning rate in the range of [1e −6 , 1e −2 ]. The images were resized into the dimensions of (224 × 224) and augmented with default augmentation transforms from fastai.
2) EXPERIMENTS
In a similar fashion, we also trained four models on the Oxford-IIIT Pet dataset.
• ResNet34: This model was trained with clean images; four epochs to the last layer and an additional four epochs to all unfrozen layers and the last layer by using learning rate policy (1cycle) [49] . • ResNet34-BaRT: We trained this model for four epochs before unfreezing the layers and four epochs more after with BaRT applied images. Here, we utilized nine groups of transforms, excluding the denoising group due to the NaN loss problem.
• ResNet34-dquant (Proposed): 1-bit dithered images were used to train the proposed model. After training was done, we evaluated the models against clean images and adversarial examples with different noise levels by FGSM and PGD, and also CW as we did with the CIFAR-10 dataset. In much the same way, we also considered two cases for ResNet34-BaRT: adding adversarial noise before BaRT and after BaRT (*ResNet34-BaRT). For ResNet34-dquant (Proposed), 1-bit dithered images were used in testing. Table 3 and 4 capture the performance of the trained models on the Oxford-IIIT Pet dataset, and Fig. 10 plots the accuracy versus varying adversarial noise distances for both FGSM (a) and PGD (b). The model trained by the proposed framework, ResNet34-dquant, had a startling result (violet line in Fig 10) . Surprisingly, the accuracy of ResNet34-dquant was even higher than the baseline model, ResNet34 (i.e., 94.99 %). Furthermore, ResNet34-dquant with the proposed system maintained the exact same accuracy for all noise distances. Therefore, the experiment results confirm that our proposed system is effective at defending against adversarial examples regardless of the noise distance. Furthermore, ResNet34-dquant removes the adversarial noise generated by CW achieving the same accuracy as shown in Table 4 .
3) RESULTS
Our baseline model, ResNet34 trained with clean images, had a 93.10 % accuracy. However, PGD attack with = 8 onwards reduced the accuracy to 0.0 %. The blue curve in Fig. 10 shows the performance of the baseline model under Fig. 10 . Under CW attack, the accuracy was dropped to 2.10 %.
ResNet34-BaRT also dropped in accuracy significantly when the noise level was higher in both scenarios (i.e., the adversarial examples before and after a random BaRT transform). When not under attack, ResNet34-BaRT had an accuracy of 83.15 %. However, the accuracy was reduced to 11.10 % for ResNet34-BaRT and 7.17 % for *ResNet34-BaRT for FGSM attacks with = 64. CW attack reduced the accuracy to 57.92 % and 46.21 % for ResNet34-BaRT and *ResNet34-BaRT respectively.
To have better insights on the performance of the proposed method, Fig. 11 shows confusion matrices for (a) ResNet34-BaRT (under PGD attack, = 64), (b) ResNet34-dquant (under PGD attack = 64) and (c) ResNet34-dquant (not under attack = 0). The number in each row and the same respective column shows the number of correct predictions and that in each row and other columns represents the number of incorrect predictions where the lighter blue represents the smaller number and the darker blue shows the bigger number in the confusion matrix as shown in Fig. 11 (d) . The confusion matrix of ResNet34-dquant under attack (b) and not under attack (c) are exactly the same because the adversarial noise was completely removed by the proposed method.
E. DISCUSSION
1) APPLICABILITY
As the model and the test data are often not in the same storage and training/testing is usually done in a cloud server, security is quintessential. Although some applications may not be security-critical, it is still desirable for neural networks to be robust against adversarial examples. As an example, the misclassification of a surveillance system may not lead to life and death situations, but it will still bring unwanted damages. Therefore, security in test images in adversarial settings is crucial in deep learning systems. This work specifically targets class C adversarial examples for the first time and achieves almost the same accuracy as the baseline model.
Another advantage of the proposed framework is immunity over different adversarial noise distances (i.e., gaining stable accuracy). Moreover, dquant does not require many transforms unlike BaRT and can scale to any image size or dataset. Therefore, the proposed work is feasible and effective at defending against class C adversarial examples.
2) LIMITATION
In this work, we focus on possible adversarial attacks by class C adversarial examples given a 1-bit test dataset (see Section III-A). Specifically, the rightful user generates a test image, quantizes it to a 1-bit image, and sends it to a server, where any possible adversarial noise is removed by linear quantization. If adversarial noise is added before 1-bit dithering (i.e., class A and B adversarial examples), dquant is not able to defend against it. The reason is that class A and B adversarial examples do not satisfy the requirements of the proposed method (i.e., clean test images have to be in 1-bit).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a mechanism for defending against adversarial attacks when test images are sent to a server for prediction. Specifically, adversarial noise generated in 1-bit images can be completely removed by simple linear quantization. Compared with a baseline model, the results show that the accuracy dropped by 5.43 % on the CIFAR-10 dataset and improved by 1.89 % on the Oxford-IIIT Pet dataset. Overall, the proposed framework achieved comparable accuracy whether or not the model was under attack with different noise distances. Our direction is towards safe applications of deep learning with provable robust models. As for future work, we shall explore adversarial noise for class A and B.
